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This chapter focuses on the means of environmental regulation—the techniques
regulators use to reduce pollution. It discusses traditional regulation (often called
command-and-control regulation), the economic theory undergirding market-based
environmental regulation, and increased use of market mechanisms. This treatment of
market mechanisms will consider them in institutional context, showing how a multilevel
governance system implements market mechanisms.
Traditional Regulation
Prior to 1970, common law courts played a leading role in addressing
environmental problems in many countries. When pollution invaded property rights,
property owners would ask judges to award damages and order pollution abatement,
claiming that the pollution constituted a trespass—an invasion of property, or a nuisance
—an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of property.1 Ironically, as
environmental problems grew worse, common law adjudication of environmental
disputes became less effective, because proving that a particular property owner had
caused a significant harm became difficult when many different polluters contributed to
an environmental problem.2
In the 1970s, developed country governments responded to growing
environmental problems by enacting statutes creating environmental ministries and
authorizing them to regulate significant pollution sources. Sometimes these statutes
contained specific requirements for specific industries, but more often they authorized
1

See, e.g., Castles Auto & Truck Service v. Exxon, 16 Fed. Appx. 163 (4th Cir. 2001); Georgia v.
Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230 (1907); Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868); Alfred’s Case, 77
Eng. Rep. 816 (1611).
2
See Chris Schroeder, Lost in the Translation: What Environmental Regulation Does that Tort Cannot
Duplicate, 41 WASHBURN L. J. 583 (2002); see, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
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environmental ministries to regulate polluters under general criteria established in a
statute. Many of these statutes aimed to fully protect public health and the environment.
But they often approached these lofty goals incrementally, relying heavily upon
technology-based regulation. Under this technology-based approach, environmental
ministries set regulatory requirements for particular industries or firms that reflect
pollution reduction technologies’ capabilities. The resulting technology-based
regulations secured significant reductions in environmental hazards in spite of population
and consumption increases, even though they often did not fully protect public health and
the environment.
Most commentators refer to technology-based regulation as command and control
regulation. This term suggests that environmental ministries regularly dictate
technological choices to regulated firms. Technology-based regulation, however, offers
some technological flexibility, when doing so is compatible with enforcement.
Environmental regulators usually implement technology-based standards through
performance standards, which require polluters to meet a particular pollution reduction
target, rather than dictate use of a preferred technology. This approach gives polluters the
freedom to choose any technology they like, as long as they meet the quantitative
pollution level required by the regulator. For example, when the United States
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) established a New Source Performance
Standard for sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants, it required that plant
operators either meet a pounds of sulfur dioxide per million British Thermal Units target
or a percentage reduction requirement for sulfur dioxide emissions.3 While EPA
anticipated that most utilities would employ “scrubbers” to meet this target, this
3

See Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
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performance standard allowed them to choose any type of scrubber or any other
technology that would meet this target.4
In cases where monitoring of pollution levels was not feasible, however,
environmental ministries often impose “work practice” standards— i.e. standards that
dictate a particular technological approach.5 For example, when EPA sought to regulate
asbestos emissions stemming from building demolition, it recognized that measurement
of these emissions would be impossible, so it required contractors to follow a specific set
of procedures, such as wetting the asbestos, which would reduce emissions. Thus,
traditional regulation relies heavily on technology-based rules implemented through a
mixture of performance and work practice standards.
Traditional regulation often relies upon uniform performance standards, i.e.
standards that require the same amount of pollution reduction from each plant in a
regulated industry. Uniform standards allow regulators to address pollution from an
entire category of pollution sources in a single proceeding and create a level playing field
for competitors within an industry.
Commentators often invoke a dichotomy between command-and-control
regulation and market mechanisms when discussing environmental regulation.6 While
this dichotomy provides a convenient shorthand, both traditional regulation and so-called
market mechanisms create markets.7 Traditional regulation requires polluters to reduce
pollution. As a result, regulated firms respond to these regulations by purchasing
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See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program? Replacing the Command
and Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289, 300 (1998).
5
See, e.g., Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978).
6
See Driesen, supra note 4.
7
See Samuel P. Hays, The Future of Environmental Regulation, 15 J.L. & COM. 549, 565-66 (1996).
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pollution control devices and services, thus creating an environmental services market.8
Conversely, we shall see that market mechanisms, like traditional regulation, generally
depend on effective government decision-making for their success.
In the 1980s, governance philosophies began to shift around the world, especially
in English speaking countries. President Reagan (US) and Prime Minister Thatcher
(UK) glorified free markets and adopted policies reflecting skepticism of government
regulation. They enjoyed intellectual support from a burgeoning law and economics
movement. The law and economics movement tended to see free markets as a
governance model and adopted economic efficiency, rather than full protection of public
health and the environment, as a major goal. In the United States, companies hoping to
escape the burdens of strict government regulation funded think tanks to spread the free
market gospel. These think tanks supported pro-business government officials, like
President Reagan, in their efforts to reform or eliminate regulation.
The rise of neoliberalism—the cultural exaltation of free markets—fueled
criticism of traditional environmental regulation and a call for reform. Neoliberal critics
referred to traditional regulation as “command and control” regulation, thus suggesting
that it was overly prescriptive. Critics derided uniform standards as a “one-size-fits-all”
approach, suggesting the need for greater flexibility. And many of them advocated two
primary reforms— increased use of market mechanisms as the means of environmental
regulation, this chapter’s theme, and use of cost-benefit analysis as a check on
environmental regulation’s stringency, the topic of Chapter 15.
Economic Theory and Market Mechanisms

8

See EBAN GOODSTEIN, THE TRADE-OFF MYTH: FACT AND FICTION ABOUT JOBS AND THE ENVIRONMENT
171 (1999).
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By convention, the term “market mechanisms” refers primarily to pollution taxes
and environmental benefit trading. This part will discuss the economic theory underlying
these two approaches. It will then briefly address three other approaches sometimes
discussed as market mechanisms — the offering of subsidies for low polluting
technologies, the use of information to create incentives for environmental improvement
and a more radical reform, and simple abandonment of regulation by environmental
ministries in favor of voluntary regulation (which is covered more extensively elsewhere
in this book).
Market-based approaches address an efficiency problem arising from the use of
uniform standards. Pollution control costs usually vary significantly from plant to plant
even within the same industry. This implies that an approach that shifted emission
reductions from facilities with high pollution control costs to facilities with low pollution
control costs could achieve any given industry-wide regulatory target at lower cost than a
uniform standard would. Market-based mechanisms encourage this sort of shift thereby
increasing the cost effectiveness of pollution control.
Economists often recommend that governments levy a tax on each pound of
pollution emitted in order to create an incentive for cost effective pollution abatement.
Once a government establishes a tax rate, polluters will presumably implement pollution
reduction projects when such projects have marginal costs less than that of paying the
tax. Conversely, polluters with pollution control options costing more than the tax rate
presumably would choose to pay the tax and continue polluting. Thus, a pollution tax
efficiently shifts reductions from high to low cost facilities.

5

This approach limits the cost of environmental protection, but makes
environmental results somewhat unpredictable. Results will depend on voluntary
responses by polluters to the tax. On the other hand, taxes place a cost on each unit of
emissions, thereby creating a continuous incentive to reduce pollution. Also, taxes raise
revenue, which can be used to subsidize environmental improvements or for other
societal goals. Such taxes can be revenue neutral, if other taxes are reduced when a
pollution tax is enacted. Unfortunately though, pollution taxes create a conflict between
the goal of providing reliable finance to government and encouraging pollution
abatement. Pollution abatement implies foregone tax revenue; significant tax revenue
implies foregone emission reductions. On the other hand, some environmental taxation
proponents claims that combining taxes on bads (pollution) with reduction of taxes on the
good of wage income can yield a “double dividend,” cleaning the environment and
increasing employment simultaneously.
The literature usually credits the Canadian economist J. H. Dales with creating an
alternative to the environmental taxation approach, environmental benefit trading.9
Under an environmental benefit trading approach, the government establishes a
performance standard for plants, just as in traditional regulation. But the government
authorizes facility owners to forego the required environmental improvement if they pay
somebody else to make extra improvements in their stead. Under this approach polluters
with high marginal control costs will avoid making pollution reductions at their own
facility and presumably pay for reductions elsewhere. Conversely, polluters with low
marginal control costs will generate additional reductions to sell to those with high

9

See J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY, AND PRICES (1968); cf. DANIEL COLE, POLLUTION & PROPERTY:
COMPARING OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION x (2002).
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marginal control costs. The shift of reductions to low cost facilities implies that private
firms will achieve the government’s chosen regulatory target at lower cost than would be
possible under a uniform standards approach.
A well-designed environmental benefit trading provides more certainty about the
quantity of reductions than a pollution tax. But this quantitative mechanism provides less
certainty about cost than a pricing mechanism like a pollution tax.
This approach usually provides only limited incentives to reduce emissions.
There is no incentive to make reductions once the regulators’ limited goals have been
achieved. This can be cured, however, by auctioning off, rather than giving away,
pollution allowances. In the past, polluters’ preferences for free allowances have
prevented substantial auctioning of allowances. But recently some regulators have
moved toward auctioning allowances in programs addressing global climate change.
Governments sometimes encourage environmental improvements by subsidizing
them. Brazil, for example, has successfully employed subsidies as a key element of a
successful strategy to develop a biofuels industry. And many countries in Europe employ
feed-in tariffs, guarantees of artificially high prices, to encourage renewable energy,
sometimes with great success.10
Just as a tax can help internalize an externalized cost, a subsidy can help
internalize clean technology’s environmental benefits, thereby having the same desirable
economic effect. But special interests tend to grow up around subsidies and demand their
continuation long after the rationale for them has vanished. Thus, governments around
the world heavily subsidize fossil fuels, a mature and environmentally devastating

10
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industry that probably should be heavily taxed rather than subsidized. Yet, governments
have sometimes managed subsidies effectively. For example, Brazil has actually reduced
its subsidies to its biofuel industry as the industry has become economically viable.
Most commentators treat efforts to use information to motivate private decisions
favoring the environment as market mechanisms. The United States in the late 1980s
enacted a “Right-to-Know” law requiring chemical companies and other large
manufacturers to report their releases of toxic chemicals into the environment. The law
required EPA to create a Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) to report the data to the public.
Subsequently, many OECD countries enacted similar mandatory disclosure laws. When
firms implementing this law sought, often for the first time, to fully characterize their
releases of toxic chemicals into the environment they discovered more releases than they
anticipated. Many firms responded to these revelations with voluntary efforts to reduce
some of these releases. 11 We need more research into what motivated these decisions.
The suggestion that the Right-to-Know Law constitutes a market mechanism implies that
firms feared that high numbers in the TRI would trigger declining sales or stock prices.
But it is at least possible that more general concerns about reputation in the community,
fears of more stringent government regulation, or even genuine concern about their
impact on the health of people working in or living near their facilities might have
motivated them. These motivations might imply that reputational, regulatory, or moral
incentives play a greater role than economic ones.
The European Union has spearheaded the use of eco-labels to inform consumers
about the environmental attributes of products, in hopes of motivating consumers to make

11

See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance
Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm, 89 GEORGETOWN L. J. 257 (2001).
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environmentally friendly purchasing decisions. A more modest and targeted program in
the United States to label tuna caught in ways that do not endanger dolphins as “dolphinsafe” survived an attack before the World Trade Organization. Economists only
hypothesize that free markets work optimally when market actors have perfect
information, and recognize the pervasiveness of incomplete information. Informational
strategies can partially remedy this market defect. In general, informing consumers and
shareholders about the environmental attributes of products in hopes of motivating
market actors to favor more environmentally friendly approaches constitutes another
alternative or supplement to traditional regulation.
Economic theory does not support a more radical reform embraced by some free
market champions and government officials, the simple abandonment of regulation.
Economic theory in general recognizes that private transactions do not take into the costs
pollution imposes on society—the harms to human health and the environment— into
account. It characterizes these costs as “externalities,” costs not internalized in market
transactions. It therefore recognizes that some environmental regulation is justified. Still
voluntary programs can work well where protecting the environment is profitable. So
programs providing information to encourage greater energy efficiency among market
actors have enjoyed significant successes. Environmentalists have also embraced
voluntary programs when political factors make government regulation completely
ineffective, as for example in efforts to conserve tropical rainforests through sustainable
logging practices, which governments have found difficult to mandate and enforce.
While the wholesale abandonment of regulation has not been popular with the public and

9

enjoys no support in economic theory, some radical neoliberals and government officials
embrace it.
The Rise of Market Mechanisms
During the 1970s, government officials occasionally discussed market-based
mechanisms and generally found them impractical. During the 1980s, however, the
debate shifted as neoliberalism began its ascent. At the beginning of the decade market
mechanisms enjoyed narrow, but somewhat powerful, support. That support primarily
came from regulated industries and pro-business government officials in the United
States. Many of these supporters regarded government regulation as too burdensome and
saw market-based mechanisms as tools to reduce the burden in spite of public support for
environmental regulation. Environmental lobbies saw these mechanisms primarily as
methods of evading pollution control and tended to oppose them.
By the end of the 1980s, however, the debate had changed dramatically, at least in
the United States. Environmental benefit trading by then had picked up the support of a
wide variety of experts. The more technocratic environmental lobbies and consultancies,
most notably the Environmental Defense Fund in the United States, embraced market
mechanisms. Increasingly, the debate became focused not so much on the question of
whether market-mechanisms were a plausible idea, but around the issues of how to
design them properly and when to use them. Environmental taxation, however, enjoyed
little support in the United States, the neoliberal ascent having increased hostility toward
taxation generally.
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In continental Europe, by contrast, significant support existed for environmental
taxation in some countries, in keeping with the recommendations of many experts.
Support for environmental benefit trading, however, developed later.
Governments have used ecological taxes, primarily in Europe. While some of
these taxes are pure pollution taxes, which are levied on a dollar per ton of pollutant
bases, most are more indirect. Examples of rather direct pollution taxes include Korea’s
tax on sulfur emissions and Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, and Czech taxes on fuel’s
sulfur content, which correlates with sulfur emissions. Indirect taxes, such as high taxes
on petrol in Europe can serve environmental goals, as petrol causes many environmental
problems. Singapore charges high taxes on automobiles, fees for vehicle entry into the
city, and charges for rush hour driving to discourage congestion and the associated
vehicular air pollution. London has recently adopted a broadly similar congestion pricing
scheme and New York City tried to follow suit, but the New York State legislature has so
far declined to allow New York City to emulate Singapore and London’s environmental
leadership. Relatively few countries have implemented sufficiently high pollution taxes
to motivate substantial emission reductions. And many ecological taxes contain
exemptions for high polluting industries, which greatly weakens their efficacy. Still,
some taxes, such as France’s water pollution tax, have proven effective.
Competitiveness concerns accompanying globalization have impeded more robust
development of pollution taxes. The European Union, for example, considered a carbon
tax in the early 1990s as a means of addressing global warming. But concerns about
whether a carbon tax could adequately address competitiveness concerns without running
afoul of World Trade Organization rules played a role in abandonment of community-
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wide taxation as the primary means of addressing climate change. Still, several European
countries, including Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, have subsequently adopted carbon
taxes as part of their strategy to address global climate change.
Environmental benefit trading has become a much more widely used approach,
primarily because of the United States’ influence. The United States began
experimenting with trading when it adopted project-based trading programs in the late
1970s. These programs treated facilities generating air emissions as if they were encased
in a bubble, focusing on plant-wide emissions, rather than achieving pollution reduction
targets at each smokestack or other pollution source within a facility. The bubble
programs (as they were called) allowed polluters to increase pollution at some units
within a facility, if they reduced pollution sufficiently at other units within the same
facility.
The bubble programs produced large cost savings, but also a lot of evasion of
emission reduction obligations.12 They failed (environmentally speaking) largely because
they allowed pollution sources that were not subject to caps or strict monitoring of
pollution levels to produce and sell emission reduction credits. This approach gave rise
to a host of problems. Polluters often claimed credit for reductions that would have
occurred anyway, rather than additional reductions. These credits then would justify
foregoing otherwise required new emission reductions. Thus, a planned emission

12

See Driesen, supra note n. ____, notes 120-127 and accompanying text (reviewing evidence and refuting
defenses of bubbles’ integrity in the economics literature); CALIFORNIA AIR RESOURCES BOARD AND
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PHASE III RULE EFFECTIVENESS STUDY OF THE
AEROSPACE COATING INDUSTRY 4 (1990) (finding that almost all large sources operating under a bubble are
not achieving required reductions); RICHARD A. LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POLLUTION REGULATION: THE
TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA’S BUBBLE 62-67, 89-91(1986) (providing examples); David Doniger, The Dark
Side of the Bubble, 4 ENVTL. F., July, 1985, 33, 34-35 (same); RICHARD A. LIROFF, AIR POLLUTION
OFFSETS: TRADING, SELLING AND BANKING 22 (1980) (explaining that offsets can be a “meaningless paper
game”).
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reduction would basically be lost. Similarly, facility owners would shut down
uneconomic facilities and claim a credit for the emission reduction associated with
ceasing operations. This phantom credit would live on, justifying foregoing new
emission reduction obligations, even after the facility died. Shutdowns could easily lead
to pollution increases at competing facilities, which could ramp up production to meet the
demand the closed facility had previously met. Because no cap applied to the industry as
a whole, the programs could not account for these demand shifts, which would in effect
mean that, once again, bubbles lost planned emission reductions.
In 1990, however, the United States created a model program, the acid rain
program.13 Because of its excellent design it garnered the support of many environmental
lobbies, including the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC), which in the past had
been a technically sophisticated opponent of trading. This program capped the pollution
levels of the major sources of sulfur dioxide, the principle pollutant responsible for acid
rain, at levels representing a significant emission reduction. It also imposed stringent
monitoring requirements and generally only allowed well-monitored capped sources to
generate credits. This program produced significant pollution reduction at low cost and
with exceptionally high compliance rates.
During the 1990s, international negotiations addressing global climate change
became a forum for debate about market-based mechanisms. This debate occurred,
because the United States, along with several of its closest allies, wanted environmental
benefit trading incorporated in the climate change regime. The European Union greeted
the idea of global environmental benefit trading with some skepticism, because of
13

See Brennan Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L. J. 2707 (1991);
Nancy Kete, The U.S. Acid Rain Allowance Trading System, in OECD, CLIMATE CHANGE: DESIGNING A
TRADABLE PERMIT SYSTEM 78-108 (1992)
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concerns about the efficacy of international environmental benefit trading. Developing
countries viewed trading as an effort by developed countries to simply evade their
responsibility to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore as inequitable.14
In spite of this skepticism, the countries adopting the Kyoto Protocol to the
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Kyoto Protocol) eventually agreed to a
globalized environmental benefit trading approach.15 Under the Kyoto Protocol,
countries and their nationals can purchase credits generated abroad to help them meet
national emission reduction targets established in the agreement. The European Union,
perhaps surprisingly, has made this approach a centerpiece of its effort to comply with
Kyoto targets even after the United States declined to ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
The European Union (EU) adopted a Directive creating the EU Emissions
Trading Scheme (ETS). The ETS required national governments, subject to European
Commission oversight, to limit the emissions of listed large industries. The ETS calls for
two phases, requiring member countries to develop National Allocation Plans (NAPs)
setting a cap for phase one and then making the caps stricter in phase two. The first
NAPs allocated too many allowances to regulated sources, and therefore led to a failure
to realize emission reductions and a collapse in the price of pollution reduction credits
generated to sell into the market. As of this writing, the European Commission has
disapproved most of the NAPs submitted for phase two, and the Commission and the
member states are working on the issue of how much reduction the phase two NAPs
should require.
14

See generally JOYEETA GUPTA, TH E CLIMATE CHANGE CONVENTION AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
FROM CONFLICT TO CONSENSUS (1997)
15
See Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention on Climate Change. U.N. Doc.
FCCC/AGBM/1997/Misc.1/Add.9 (1997), reprinted without certain technical corrections in 37 I.L.M. 22
(1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
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The EU also has adopted a “linking directive,” which allows European countries
and their nationals to purchase credits realized through emission reduction projects
undertaken outside the EU. Thus, the ETS has become a hybrid program, combining
elements of the cap-and-trade approach successfully employed in the United States to
address acid rain with crediting from project-based mechanisms that have a lot in
common with the failed bubble programs.
The Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) exemplifies the
problematic nature of project-based trading. This mechanism allows project developers
to earn pollution reduction credits through pollution reducing projects in developing
countries, even though these countries are not subject to caps on their emissions. The
Kyoto Protocol seeks to avoid the problems of the bubble programs by requiring that
projects provide “additional” emission reductions.16 But the CDM’s Executive Board
(the primary oversight body) has approved many projects where only a tiny fraction of
project revenue comes from credit purchases. Under such circumstances, it is very likely
that these projects would have been undertaken without the availability of pollution
reduction credit.17 Once the credit is approved and sold, however, the purchaser will use
the credit to justify not making an otherwise required reduction. Thus, an emission
reduction is lost and no additional emission reduction is realized to compensate for this
loss. Recent research suggests that these project-based trades have produced a significant
loss of emission reductions.18 This subject, however, certainly requires additional
16

See Axel Michaelowa, Determination of Baselines and Additionality for the CDM: A Crucial Element
of Credibility of the Climate Regime, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND CARBON MARKETS: A HANDBOOK OF
EMISSION REDUCTION METHODS (F. Yamin ed. 2005).
17
See C Sutter & J.C. Parreño, Does the Current Clean Development Mechanism Deliver its Sustainable
Development Claim? An Analysis of Officially Registered CDM Projects, 84 CLIMATIC CHANGE 75 (2007).
18
See Larry Lohman, Accounting, Organizations, and Society, at 12 (2008) (forthcoming); MICHAEL
WARA & DAVID G. VICTOR, A REALISTIC POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL CARBON OFFSETS, (Program on

15

research. In the past, follow-up studies have been too sporadic, but usually quite
damning in the project-based context.
Another problem feared by a number of analysts involves so-called “hot air”
credits undermining the achievements of the Kyoto Protocol. Countries formerly part of
the Soviet Union, including Russia, assumed caps substantially higher than their current
emission under the Kyoto Protocol. These higher caps reflected hard bargaining by
Russia and the decline in emissions after 1990 that came about as an artifact of economic
collapse in the former Soviet Union. These countries could, in principle, sell credits
reflecting the difference between their current emissions and their cap to countries with
real emission reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. These countries, in turn,
could completely forego any real effort to reduce emissions, achieving virtual compliance
through purchase of phantom credits. So far, the possibility of credits becoming more
valuable in the future and EU member states’ concerns about their environmental
credibility has limited the use of hot air credits. But this sort of problem may yet
undermine the Kyoto Protocol’s achievements, as member states approach their
compliance deadlines and face hard choices between making real changes and buying
their way out of their obligations. The main point is that a well designed trading program
can succeed, but most trading programs afford multiple opportunities to evade
compliance obligations in complicated ways that can sometimes escape public
recognition.
Since the adoption of the EU ETS, the debate on market mechanisms has shifted
markedly, especially within continental Europe. The debate focuses heavily on questions
Energy and Sustainable Development Working Paper #74, 2008), available at
http://pesd.stanford.edu/publications/a_realistic_policy_on_international_carbon_offsets/; Michael Wara, Is
the Global Carbon Market Working? 445 NATURE 595 (2007).
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of design and institutional architecture, and less on the question of whether trading is
workable in an international context.
In the wake of the acid rain program’s success, many countries adopted
environmental trading approaches even apart from the climate change context and it
became a dominant regulatory strategy within the United States. The use of tradable
fishing quotas as a fishery management tool, for example, became common around the
world.19 Under this approach, regulators limit the allowable catch, just as they might
without a trading program, in order to conserve a fishery. But they allow those who catch
fewer fish than their quota permits to sell the unused portion of the quota to other
fishermen, who can use the purchased allowances to justify exceeding their quota. These
programs have generated controversy; as they are difficult to monitor and do not
effectively address the problem of bycatch (catching too much fish not subject to the
quota regime) or ecosystem effects.20
Regulatory scholars think of market-based mechanisms as examples of
privatization, since both environmental taxation and environmental benefit trading
provide greater scope for private choice than traditional regulation. Taxes allow private
parties to decide whether to reduce environmental impacts at all; trading allows private
parties to choose the location of reductions and the technology used. Both taxes and

19

See Suzi Kerr, Evaluation of the Cost Effectiveness of the New Zealand Individual Transferable Quota
Fisheries Market, in TRADABLE PERMITS: POLICY EVALUATION, DESIGN, AND REFORM (OECD 2004);
M.D. Young, The Design of Fishing-Right Systems-The NSW Experience, 31 ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS 305
(1999); W. Davidson, Lessons from Twenty Years of Experience with Property Rights in the Dutch Fishery,
in THE DEFINITION AND ALLOCATION OF USE RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN FISHERIES: PROCEEDINGS OF A SECOND
WORKSHOP HELD IN BREST, FRANCE, 5-7 MAY 1999 (A. Hatcher & K. Robinson eds. 1999); L.G.
Anderson, Privatizing Open Access Fisheries: Individual Transferable Quotas, in THE HANDBOOK OF
ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS (D.W. Bromley ed. 1995); J.J.C. Ginter, The Alaska Community
Development Quota Fisheries Management Program, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MGM’T 147 (1995)
20
See Tom Tietenberg, Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice, in MOVING TO MARKETS IN
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 71-75 (Jody Freeman & Charles D. Kolstad eds. 2007).
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trading, however, depend heavily upon the efficacy of government decision-making,
since governments must choose a sufficient tax rate or regulatory cap in order for market
mechanisms to be effective.
Both forms of regulation also require effective government enforcement. A tax
on each pound of emissions requires measurement of emissions. If the government lacks
the capacity to adequately monitor taxed emissions, then polluters can evade their tax
obligation by understating their emissions. Trading further complicates enforcement by
requiring measurement of emission reductions in two places in order to verify that one
party has complied with the terms of a trading program. When a polluter exceeds its
allowance and relies on purchased allowances to make up the difference, it has only
complied if the allowances purchased reflect the amount of pollution reduction claimed
and the actual emissions at its facility exceed the limit by the proper amount and not
more. This means regulators must verify both claimed debits and credits to know
whether a facility has complied with a pollution reduction obligation through trading.
Broad trading programs can multiply the number and types of credits requiring
verification and therefore strain regulatory capacity, but narrower programs can be well
monitored.
Thus, the acid rain program succeeded largely because the United States Congress
imposed a cap demanding a large reduction in emissions and required state-of-the-art
continuous emissions monitoring. By contrast, programs with less demanding emission
limits underlying them or that allow credits from sources not subject to caps and strict
monitoring requirements often fail. Trading offers private actors choice in the selection
of reduction techniques and locations, which makes them attractive to regulated firms and

18

neoliberal governments. But they depend for their efficacy on effective government
monitoring and enforcement.21
Unfortunately no purchaser of an emission reduction credit has any intrinsic
reason to care about the quality of the service he is purchasing. If the credit is good
enough for the regulator, it satisfies the buyer. Environmental benefit markets differ
from more conventional markets in this respect. If you buy a pair of blue jeans, you do
care about its quality, whether the government does or not. If they are not well made
they will wear out. This intrinsic concern for quality acts as a force encouraging the
producers of ordinary consumer goods to make goods of reasonably good quality. Poor
quality emission credits, however, offer the cheapest and best compliance option, unless
government regulators recognize their poor quality and disallow their use.22
Early trading proponents claimed that trading not only increases regulation’s cost
effectiveness, but also sparks more innovation than traditional regulation ever did.23 This
claim, in its simplest form at least, has fallen into disrepute.24 Trading reduces incentives
to innovate among polluters with high control costs (they can escape by purchasing
credits), while increasing incentives for innovation at those with low costs (they can go
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See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1, 12 (2008)
See David M. Driesen, Free Lunch or Cheap Fix?: The Emissions Trading Idea and the Climate Change
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“beyond compliance” in order to sell credits to the escapees).25 Therefore, the innovation
picture is complex.26
Trading eliminates any incentive to employ innovations costing more than the
relatively low cost generated by the permit market.27 This can eliminate incentives for
the most technologically advanced innovations, which often prove expensive.28 On the
other hand, the increased flexibility trading provides can provide incentives to employ
some types of low cost innovation that would be lacking in a less flexible system.
Careful empirical work on the acid rain trading program in the United States
shows less innovation in the acid rain program than in the traditional regulatory program
that preceded it.29 The scholars reaching this conclusion have disagreed about whether
trading may nevertheless have changed the type of innovation. A tension exists between
maximizing short term cost effectiveness and maximizing long-term technological
advancements that depend on initially expensive innovation.

Emissions trading

maximizes short term cost effectiveness, not necessarily long-term technological
advancement.30

We clearly need more and better research that seeks to compare

emissions trading’s track record in stimulating innovation with that of alternative
approaches. Such research must take care to distinguish innovation, the introduction of
new technology, from diffusion, the spread of old technology and carefully compare
25
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trading and comparable non-trading approaches while accounting for other variables,
such as stringency, that can influence innovation rates.31
Innovation can be important in advancing our capabilities to meet significant
environmental challenges over time.32 On the other hand, incremental change, which
well designed trading programs encourage in a cost effective way, can sometimes prove
useful.
We have some experience with special kinds of incentive mechanisms that may
perform better than trading or taxes alone in spurring innovation.33 One can use negative
economic incentives to spur positive economic incentives.34 An example comes from
France’s use of effluent fees to fund waste water treatment, with very good results.
Systems that require a deposit on beverage containers and then pay for returned empty
containers have spurred a lot of clean-up of litter, not an especially innovative response
technologically, but one that suggests the power of combining positive and negative price
incentives.35

California has proposed a system where purchasers of high emission

vehicles would pay a fee that would subsidize purchase of low emission vehicles.36 Such
feebate systems may powerfully influence innovation as they simultaneously punish
polluters and reward cleanup. Germany has enacted a law requiring manufacturers to
31
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take back and properly dispose of packaging accompanying products. This approach
creates a powerful incentive to minimize packaging by forcing an internalization of
disposal costs, which usually have been externalized.
Environmental benefit trading also raises environmental justice issues in many
contexts. Even in the United States, which has become almost religious in its devotion to
trading approaches, the government has often recognized that trading of carcinogenic
pollutants raises serious ethical issues. Under a trading approach, a polluter can leave its
neighbors exposed to very high cancer risk if it pays somebody else far away to reduce
emissions. This problem materialized in California when regulators allowed petroleum
refiners in low income communities of color to escape pollution control obligations in
exchange for payments for reductions in vehicle pollution. This left communities near
the plant exposed to cancer risks that would have been significantly reduced in the
absence of trading. This led to a lawsuit and a political uproar that derailed one of
California’s emissions trading programs.
Indifference to the location of reductions might be perfectly justifiable with
respect to a globally mixed pollutant like carbon dioxide, but can seem unethical when
pollutants’ effects on particular communities depend on their location. But trading under
the Kyoto Protocol has given rise to some less obvious equitable concerns. For example,
a project capturing methane emissions from a landfill slated for closure in South Africa
gave rise to fears that this remnant of apartheid would remain open because of revenue
from the trading markets. Just as relentless pursuit of short term cost effectiveness does
not necessarily coincide with long-term technological development, so may short term
efficiency, in some cases, conflict with fairness.
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Multilevel Trading
Instrument choice and implementation of the chosen instrument take place in the
context of a proliferation of multilevel governance. At the same time, once governments
select market mechanisms, the selection and the ideology underlying the selection, can
influence governance structures.
The Kyoto Protocol offers perhaps the best vehicle for exploring the layering of
governance levels. For choices about whether to use trading and how to implement it
when it is used in this context involve numerous levels of government as well as novel
private sector roles.

This multiplicity, however, is not unique to the Kyoto Protocol.

Rather, the Kyoto Protocol offers an especially intricate example of multileveled
governance.
In the past, many international agreements have limited the pollution coming from
the countries involved without specifying the mechanisms for limiting pollution.37 It
would be possible to craft a climate change agreement that established reduction targets
for national governments, but said nothing about how they should achieve these targets.
Such an approach would leave countries quite free to choose between traditional
regulation, emissions trading, pollution taxes, and even voluntary approaches, as long as
the countries met their internationally agreed upon goals.
The parties to the Kyoto Protocol, however, decided to address the instrument
choice issue in the international agreement itself, rather than only on the national level.
As a result, the Kyoto Protocol contains no less than three emissions trading programs,
allowing developed countries, and often their regulated firms, to purchase credits from
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developing countries through the Clean Development Mechanism, from Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union through the Joint Implementation Program, and from other
developed countries with reduction obligations under the Kyoto Protocol.

The big

advantage of this global approach, however fragmented, is that it allows for international
trading of emission reduction credits. The large market thus created will tend to produce
greater cost savings than a smaller market would have.38 At the same time, the use of
international trading greatly increases the complexity of institutional challenges facing
governments implementing the trading programs, which creates risks of lost emission
reductions.
The Kyoto Protocol itself, however, does not operationalize any trading program.
It simply creates a framework for these programs that would only come to life if
implemented by nation states.

This feature of the Kyoto Protocol is common to

substantially all international environmental agreements; they all depend on national
implementation, because there is no international bureaucracy capable of regulating
private conduct directly.39 Since most environmental harms stem from private production
and consumption decisions, countries, or some other sub-global governmental unit, must
enact regulatory programs in order to implement international agreements aimed at
reducing environmental hazards.
The European Union assumed a leadership role in coordinating Europe’s
implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, while still leaving many substantial decisions to
member states. Thus, the European Union as a whole, not each member state, chose to
implement an emissions trading program.
38
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decision embodied in the Kyoto Protocol to favor trading. While the Kyoto Protocol did
not require countries to use trading, its support for trading no doubt influenced the EU
decision to adopt it.
While the EU as a whole made some important trading design decisions, it left the
most important decision of all, the amount of reductions to require from facilities in the
trading scheme, largely to member states.40 Yet, the ETS does provide for European
Commission review of the NAPs, and provides criteria under which the European
Commission may disapprove of insufficiently ambitious NAPs, which the Commission
has exercised. The decision to leave critical decisions about the stringency of caps
primarily to member states left those states vulnerable to lobbying based on
competitiveness concerns.

This vulnerability contributed to weakness in the NAPs,

especially with respect to highly competitive energy intensive industries, like aluminum
smelting. The European Commission has recognized this problem and is considering
having the EU set the cap for a third phase of trading envisioned after 2012.
Because the EU trading scheme links up with the “project-based mechanisms”
(the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation programs that garner
credits from individual projects), the integrity of the scheme depends upon effective
oversight of claims of emission reduction credits earned around the world. The Kyoto
Protocol has spawned a complex multi-level governance structure seeking to assure these
credits’ integrity.
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At the international level, the Kyoto Protocol has created subsidiary bodies to
exercise oversight and provide expert advice. The most prominent of these bodies is the
CDM Executive Board, which approves methodologies for estimating emission
reductions from various types of projects. It also must approve projects before project
developers can sell credits in the international markets. Since this body cannot itself
verify emission reductions on the ground in the developing countries where developers
carry out CDM projects, Kyoto’s architecture relies on national governments and private
entity enforcement of the Kyoto Protocol as well.

The Kyoto Protocol delegates

decisions about whether projects contribute to “sustainable development” to host country
governments, which may disapprove of projects, but these governments, with the notable
exception of China, have rarely exercised serious oversight. Since developing countries
often lack the capacity to monitor and verify emission reductions, the Kyoto Protocol
privatizes that function, allowing “designated operational entities” to verify emission
reductions. The CDM Executive Board must approve these entities. In practice though,
these entities are usually consultant firms hired by the project developer. This means that
conflicts of interest threaten the system’s integrity.41

Whether ultimately successful or

not, international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol has spawned a complex
architecture, with responsibilities shared among global international bodies (CDM
Executive Board), regional international bodies (EU Commission), national governments,
and private entities.
Because the United States’ federal government has not implemented the Kyoto
Protocol, subnational governmental bodies in that country initially took the lead in
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addressing climate change, including the initiation of emissions trading programs.42 The
first program, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), consists of an agreement
of governors of the northeastern states to require emission reductions from their electric
utilities and allow trading to reduce the cost of these reductions.43 This agreement not
only offers an example of regional governance, it embodies multilevel governance within
the region.

The agreement creates a “Regional Organization” to perform central

coordinating tasks, such as auctioning allowances.44 Furthermore, the regional agreement
resolves very important issues, such as the amount of reductions required, on the regional
level.45 But it leaves many important decisions, (e.g. how many of the allowances to
auction, how to use revenue realized from the auction) to states within the region.
California and other states also are currently moving toward implementing emissions
trading schemes.46
Of course, all of this leads to coordination difficulties.

The European

Commission has been in contact with California and RGGI staff to discuss coordination
issues. When the United States federal government enacts an emissions trading scheme,
it will face an issue of how to coordinate its effort with the state programs already
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underway. The European Union has already faced a similar issue arising from an early
emissions trading program in the United Kingdom, which predated the EU ETS.
Those seeking to coordinate these programs will face the familiar issues
regulators confront in an age of globalization and multilevel governance, albeit in a
slightly different context. Many of those running these programs have accepted free
trade principles at the heart of neoliberalism, and think that a well coordinated global
market would be better than a series of national and sub-national markets.

Such

coordination can maximize the cost savings trading programs can deliver.47 At the same
time, such coordination may spark a race-to-the-bottom, as countries that restrict credit
sales into their markets to make sure that they meet strict standards of environmental
integrity may come under pressure to avoid interference with the global market in
credits.48 Already, most jurisdictions generating credits for sale in international markets
exercise very little oversight, because of competitiveness concerns. If project developers
cannot develop their preferred projects in one country, they can just go elsewhere.
Government bodies will face conflicting pressures. Lovers of free markets will
clamor to reduce transaction costs that might impede trades.49

But supporters of

environmental integrity will insist on raising transaction costs to pay for the oversight
needed to make sure that only environmentally sound projects generate credits.50 Hence,
international environmental benefit trading markets create problems similar to those
associated with globalization more generally.
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Multilevel environmental governance and many of its complexities arise whether
or not regulators employ market mechanisms. But when they choose market mechanisms
that traverse national borders, they greatly complicate the governance challenges they
face. And the neoliberalism that supports environmental benefit trading generally also
supports the broadest possible trading markets. Environmental benefit trading offers
terrific potential for cost reduction, but poses significant challenges for regulators, which
grow exponentially when the mechanism is globalized.
Conclusion
Market-based instruments have become increasingly important as neoliberalism
has advanced. While these instruments provide a cost effective way of realizing
environmental improvements, they depend on government design and enforcement for
their efficacy. Increasingly, designers of emissions trading programs in particular find
themselves operating in a complex context of multilevel governance.

29

